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Whether in verbal or visual form, the discourse produced by theKuomintang (KMT) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)during the campaign for the presidential and legislative elections,
which were held jointly on 14 January 2012, show clearly the determination
of both parties to win over voters in the centre. In this sense, these elections
are a continuation of those in 2008. In parallel with a defence of its record and
of the advantages of the rapprochement with the People’s Republic of China
(PRC), the Kuomintang once again put forward its identification with Taiwan
and its commitment to the protection of the interests of the population. (1)
Pride in being Taiwanese, the love of the island as “home,” and the valuing of
“unity in diversity” – all favourite DPP themes – were at the heart of the sym-
bolic staging of campaign rallies and TV spots during the whole campaign.
But the convergence of themes was not only the result of tactical choices
by the KMT. Under the leadership of Tsai Ing-wen, the DPP also opted for
an approach aimed at winning over undecided voters and those disen-
chanted by Ma Ying-jeou’s presidency. Aware of the impossibility of calling
into question the liberalisation of trade with China, which is now considered
by the majority of the population as essential to the maintenance of pros-
perity, (2) the DPP centred its campaign on increasing social inequality and
on how to resolve the economic problems of ordinary Taiwanese, rather
than anti-Chinese and openly pro-independence rhetoric. Moreover, apart
from the intense debates that followed Ma Ying-jeou’s proposal to sign a
peace agreement with China in the decade following his re-election, the
theme of the Chinese military threat was significantly absent from the cam-
paign.
All in all, both the KMT and the DPP pushed their long-term objectives
into the background – unification for the former, and for the latter interna-
tional recognition of an undisputable reality, the independence of Taiwan.
Putting aside their pan-Chinese and Taiwanese nationalist rhetorics, both
parties built their campaigns on modulated versions of the same themes:
identification with Taiwan, the over-riding importance of protecting the eco-
nomic interests and dignity of the Taiwanese population, ways of assuring
the continuing prosperity of the island, and the definition of a modus vivendi
with the PRC. However one must go beyond this convergence in order to
identify the factors that led, on the one hand, to the re-election of Ma Ying-
jeou, but with a much smaller lead (51.6 percent of the vote as opposed to
58.45 percent in 2008), and on the other to the relatively weak showing of
Tsai Ing-wen, who received only 45.63 percent of the vote, when many ob-
servers were predicting a narrow victory by one or the other of the candi-
dates. (3)
With a view to contributing to the analysis of the results of these elec-
tions, this article focuses particularly on the segment of the electorate aged
between 20 and 29 at the time of the vote. They made up almost a fifth
(19 percent) of the 18 million voters, and around 1.2 million of them had
the opportunity to vote for the first time. (4) Perceived as one of the keys to
victory by most observers because of their low party identification and their
indecision, these young voters, and more especially the “first-time voters”
(shoutouzu 首投族), were the main target of the campaigns on both sides.
This article will seek to explain why, having pinned their hopes on the can-
didacy of Tsai Ing-wen right up to the last weeks, the majority of the 20-29
age group finally decided to vote for Ma Ying-jeou. It will therefore analyse
the perception young voters had of the two parties and of their candidates,
as well as their attitude to the themes of the campaign.
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1. The KMT thus continued with two themes that had been put forward in the preceding campaign,
but which had then been abandoned in favour of a cultural and educational policy that sought
to “re-sinicise” Taiwan.
2. The “Ten Year Political Platform” (shinian zhenggang 十年政綱) drawn up by the DPP for the elec-
tions reflects this position, while stating that China is just one part of the world. For the section
on “trade between the two shores” (liang an jingmao 兩岸經貿 ), see: http://10.iing.tw/
2011/08/blog-post_21.html (in Mandarin; consulted on 7 May 2012).
3. The third candidate in the presidential election, Soong Chu-yu, received only 2.77 percent of the
vote, and his party, the Qinmindang (親民黨), three of the 113 seats in the Legislative Yuan. The
Kuomintang got 64 seats and the “green” side 43, of which 40 went to the DPP and three to the
Alliance for the Union of Taiwan. Given the weakness of these results and the fact that the leg-
islative elections were largely overshadowed by the presidential contest, this article will deal es-
sentially with the campaigns of Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen.
4. In Taiwan the legal voting age is 20.
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Research methods: Structuring tendencies
and the following of the campaign
The analysis in this article is the result of a comparison of surveys carried
out to identify the structural lines of the vote among voters who were aged
between 20 and 29 at the time of the poll, and to follow opinion among this
section of the electorate during the whole campaign. Following Karl
Mannheim’s work, it has been shown elsewhere that young people born in
the 1980s (or more precisely between 1982 and 1991) make up a separate
generation in that they were socialised in an environment radically different
from that of their elders: a state – the “Republic of China on Taiwan” – whose
identity, while hybrid, was symbolically recentred on the territory of the island
alone; and a prosperous society undergoing democratic consolidation, increas-
ingly open to trade with China and to the influence of the rest of the world
on its values and its modes of consumption. (5) This socialisation framework
makes it possible to envisage highlighting certain characteristics specific to
this post-reform generation and likely to influence the political and identity
position of its members, and therefore their vote. However, it is also essential
to take into account the cyclical factors linked to the campaign itself: the is-
sues raised, the symbolic forms of discourse, and the events that marked it.
Two surveys provide data showing the general position of the young vot-
ers. The first is an opinion poll conducted by the author in spring 2012 using
a paper questionnaire made up of 82 questions (of which 23 were open-
ended) distributed in 15 institutions of higher education spread over the
whole of the territory of Taiwan. (6) The sample was built up on the basis of
statistics provided by the Ministry of Education for the university year 2009-
2010. The departments in each institution were chosen as part of a non-
probabilistic method of sampling, i.e., not by carrying out a blind draw of
the individuals chosen, but by establishing quotas that reflected the com-
position of the student body according to three criteria: gender, field of
study, and geographical distribution. These criteria were retained when it
came to the issues raised in the questionnaire (ethnicity, national identity,
party identification, perception of China, defensive spirit, values) and to the
influence they might have on the answers provided. The division between
public and private institutions was also taken into account, but with less
precision; students enrolled in public institutions were over-represented,
amounting to half (50.8 percent) of those questioned whereas they
amounted to only a third (32.2 percent) of those enrolled in the university
year 2009-2010. Ethnicity, however, was not used as a factor in the con-
struction of quotas, as one of the main objectives of the questionnaire was
to avoid the injunctive effect of the categorisation that is usually used in
opinion polls in Taiwan. This was in order to find out to what extent these
identity categories remain relevant to this generation. A total of 575 answers
were analysed. In order to ensure as high a return as possible, as well the
maintenance of the quotas, a teacher was contacted in each of the institu-
tions selected, and the teacher agreed to pass on the questionnaires to the
students, who were free, if they so wished, to return their answers in an en-
velope in order to guarantee confidentiality. In terms of analysing the be-
haviour of voters between 20 and 29 years old, it must be emphasised that
the data provided presents a bias towards those young people who benefit
from higher education. According to the Ministry of Education, in 2009-
2010, slightly less than two-thirds (64.5 percent) of the age bracket con-
cerned were in higher education.
A second, much smaller survey, carried out during the spring and summer
of 2011, completed the results of this questionnaire by focusing on eco-
nomic questions. It was made up of the information provided by 27 young
people aged 24 to 30 who had already been in the job market for at least
a year. The people interviewed were selected through the intermediary of
five assistants, who were each asked to recruit five or six people according
to limited criteria: gender, age, and field of work. These were asked to provide
written answers to ten open questions dealing with both the state of the
Taiwanese economy ( job market, working conditions, wages, purchasing
power, income inequality, etc.) and the evolution in economic relations with
China.
These data, which made it possible to highlight the structural tendencies
of the choices made by this segment of the electorate, were comple-
mented by a more dynamic approach to the campaign. This consisted
firstly of analysis of the discourse produced by each side during the election
debates and through the dozens of campaign clips broadcast on TV and
on the Web. A total of 77 videos were watched, of which 49 were produced
by the KMT (7) and 28 by the DPP. (8) The special attention given to these
films is justified by the fact that they form rhetorical and symbolic con-
centrates of the discourse of each side and that they were often aimed at
the young.
The dynamic monitoring of the position of young voters towards this dis-
course, as well as their expectations and opinions of the parties, candidates,
and programmes, was carried out in two ways: through interviews con-
ducted during the campaign, in particular during rallies; and in focus groups
organised with students in November and December 2011, as well as in
March 2012. Each of them included four to six people who were already of
voting age in 2008. One of the objectives was to collect their opinions and
place them in a comparative perspective with 2008.
The image of the candidates and their
parties at the beginning of the campaign
Tsai Ing-wen, from the time of her victory at the DPP primary at the end
of April 2011 and her entry into the presidential race, seemed to be in a po-
sition to defeat Ma Ying-jeou. Several opinion polls showed that she had
high popularity ratings and voter support. Three polls carried out on 27 April
for media close to the KMT, United Daily News (Lianhebao), The China
Times (Zhongguoshibao), and the cable TV station TVBS, showed that the
gap between the two candidates (Soong Chu-yu had not yet declared his
candidacy) was paper thin, with Tsai leading by 1 and 0.4 points in the first
two polls, and Ma 1 point ahead in the third. (9) The campaign looked difficult
for the incumbent president. The work of reorganisation carried out by Tsai
Ing-wen since her accession to the presidency of the DPP three years earlier
had borne fruit, making it possible to turn the page on Chen Shui-bian and
to win back part of the electorate that had been lost in 2008. (10) At least
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5. Tanguy Le Pesant, “Generational Change and Ethnicity among 1980s-born Taiwanese,” Journal of
Current Chinese Affairs, vol. 40, no. 1, 2011, pp. 137-139.
6. For a more detailed description of the sampling method, see: ibid., pp. 141-143.
7. Forty-six of them were online, on the YouTube link of the KMT campaign site, “Taiwanbravo”:
www.youtube.com/user/taiwanbravotw (consulted on 7 May 2012).
8. While they are no longer online on Tsai Ing-wen’s campaign site, they can be found on YouTube
or from the blog Letters from Taiwan: http://lettersfromtaiwan.tumblr.com/post/13637731738/
taiwan-election-campaign-videos (consulted on 7 May 2012).
9. Taipei Times, 29 April 2011, p. 1.
10. The DPP’s image was badly damaged by accusations of fraud made against Chen Shui-bian and
his entourage. After a trial that raised a number of questions about the independence of the
judicial system, Chen was sentenced, in November 2010, to 17 years and 6 months in prison. J.
Bruce Jacobs, Democratizing Taiwan, Brill, Leiden, Boston, 2012, pp. 261-266.
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this was the impression given by the success of the DPP in the partial leg-
islative elections, and the good results obtained in the local elections of De-
cember 2010. Conversely Ma’s popularity had been very low since the
summer of 2009. (11)
Most of the polls carried out in the months following the selection of the
two candidates showed that the crisis facing Ma was particularly serious
among the young voters who had largely contributed to his victory in 2008.
According to the TVBS poll referred to above, at the end of April 2011, Tsai
Ing-wen had 51 percent of voting intentions among 20-to-29-year-olds, as
against 42 percent for Ma Ying-jeou. In mid-September, the gap was just as
wide, with Tsai ahead of Ma by 12 points (50 to 38 percent). (12) The Blues
became quickly aware of the crisis, which was called “extreme” by one of
its MPs, Wu Yu-sheng (吳育昇). (13) On the occasion of the third anniversary
of Ma’s nomination, on 20 May 2011, the pro-government newspapers did
not conceal their anxiety about the president’s chances of re-election. (14)
Among the reasons given by Lianhebao were the loss of credibility of a pres-
ident who now lacked charisma and who seemed tired in the face of the
freshness and dynamism of the DPP candidate.
The interviews carried out in the spring and autumn of 2011 and the dis-
cussions held in the framework of the focus groups confirmed this impres-
sion and highlighted two trends. On the one hand was the re-mobilisation
of young Green voters who had abstained in 2008, disillusioned by corrup-
tion scandals involving Chen Shui-bian and his entourage, and by a nation-
alism that was seen as too radical because it excluded any possibility of
dialogue with China and disowned the Chinese dimension of Taiwanese
identity. On the other hand were the serious doubts felt by the portion of
the young electorate who had supported Ma in 2008, and who had often
pinned hopes on the candidacy of a politician to whom they attributed nu-
merous qualities. They saw in him an upright, dynamic, and charismatic man
whose example raised the aspirations of the Kuomintang; a moderate who
would be able to find a modus vivendi with China while enjoying favourable
relations with the United States; endowed with an international education
and profile (Harvard Law PhD, excellent English) that would certainly allow
him to fly the colours of Taiwan prominently; dynamic and with experience
at all the administrative levels (secretary to Chiang Ching-kuo, Minister,
Mayor of Taipei from 1998 to 2006).
But these interviews and the survey carried out in 2010 also highlighted
the low level of party identification among the young born in the 1980s.
Only 38.6 percent of the students who answered the questionnaires sup-
ported a party: 19.5 percent favoured the KMT, 17.9 percent the DPP and
1.2 percent a different party. This has two consequences: a very high level
of abstention, especially among first-time voters, (15) and a shift in voting
that can be massive between elections, but also throughout a campaign.
The high volatility of this age group’s vote is firstly explained by their atti-
tude to politics. However, its characteristics need to be spelt out and a dis-
tinction needs to be made between behaviour stemming from generational
factors and those that should be attributed to an “age-group effect.”
It is often said that Taiwanese born after the beginning of the 1980s show
no interest in politics. Some observers even see this as the principal char-
acteristic of a generation born into smaller and relatively prosperous fami-
lies, who grew up in a democratic and much more permissive consumer
society. (16) In other words, to its detractors, Taiwanese youth has been taken
over by the “dark side of individualism,” as described by Charles Taylor in
the case of the West. (17) Trapped in destructive relativism, excessive self-
preoccupation, and narcissistic introversion, they are deemed to replace po-
litical, social, and to a lesser extent spiritual concerns that transcend the
Self with an ideology of self-realisation reduced to bland consumer pleas-
ures.
While these criticisms do indeed apply to a portion of Taiwanese youth, it
would be excessive to extend them to the whole post-reform generation.
The answers to the 2010 questionnaire show a much more finely-shaded
reality. Only a third (34.6 percent) of the students questioned say they have
either “absolutely no interest” (15.8 percent) or “very little interest” (18.8
percent) in political matters, while another third (37.7 percent) are “mod-
erately” interested and 2.4 percent have “no opinion” on the subject. In con-
trast, a quarter of them (25.4 percent) show either “some interest” (21.9
percent) or “a lot of interest” (3.5 percent) in politics. As I have shown else-
where, the lack of interest in politics must also be attributed to the “age-
group effect.” (18) Parental pressure, the imperative of success, an overloaded
schedule, the daily hours of cramming, and the frantic rhythm to which
most schoolchildren and high school students are subjected enclose them
in a “school bubble” from which they emerge only after the university en-
trance examinations. This bubble keeps them outside the concerns of the
“real world,” and then the existential shock produced by its bursting gener-
ates a delayed political socialisation and certainly contributes to intensifying
the impression of narcissistic introversion. However, following up on a num-
ber of young people during their university programme and after their entry
into the job market shows that this generation is far from being entirely
numbed by the opium of consumerism. Among the students whose progress
I have been able to follow, more than a few have developed awareness of
citizenship over the years. But their growing interest in public affairs is often
expressed in a disembodied form, through the computer, and/or in a very
localised manner. This is why it may be overlooked by an observer whose
“sociological radar” would seek out institutionalised movements, affiliated
to a political side or party, over the long-term, and physically present in the
streets and public spaces.
The refusal to commit to a political side is also due to the deep disgust
that young Taiwanese citizens show for the political scene as they perceive
it, which is to say one made up of sterile disagreements, of dirty tricks and
baseless mutual accusations, of manipulations of all sorts, of abuses of
power, and of corruption. Three-quarters (74.4 percent) of the students
questioned in 2010 about the quality of the Taiwanese political environment
and debates considered that they are “bad” (46.2 percent) or “extremely
bad” (28.2 percent). Only 15 (2.6 percent) thought the contrary.
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11. Frank Muyard, “Analyse de la présidence de Ma Ying-jeou à mi-mandat” (A mid-term analysis of
Ma Ying-jeou’s presidency), Perspectives chinoises, 2010/3, pp. 14 and 19-20.
12. Poll taken by the TVBS Poll Centre between 20 and 22 September 2011.The sample was made up
exclusively of people over 20 who stated their intention to vote on election day. The remaining
12 percent intended to vote but did not yet know for whom. 
13. Taipei Times, 29 April 2011, p. 1
14. Lianhebao, 20 May 2011, p. A2 ; Wangbao, 20 May 2011, p. A2.
15. According to a survey of first-time voters carried out by the Observation Group on National Pol-
itics (shoutouzu guozheng guanchatuan 首投族國政觀察團) published at the end of December
2011, half of the voters who had the opportunity to vote for the first time in a presidential election
had abstained in 2008.
16. Yvonne Chang and Joanne Chen, “Strawberries the Frame,” Taiwan Review, vol. 57, no. 10, October
2007, http://taiwanreview.nat.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=24696&CtNode=128 (consulted on 30 March
2011).
17. Charles Taylor, The Malaise of Modernity, Concord (ON), Anansi, 1991, p. 4.
18. On this subject, see: Jean-Pierre Cabestan and Tanguy Le Pesant, L’esprit de défense de Taiwan
face à la Chine. La jeunesse taiwanaise face à la tentation de la Chine (Taiwan’s spirit of de-
fence against China: Young Taiwanese and the temptation of China), L’Harmattan, 2009,
pp. 76-86.
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All in all, given the low level of politicisation of this fringe of the electorate,
the frequent difficulty in making a clear distinction between the two sides,
and a widespread distrust of the parties, the decision as to whether or not
to vote and the choice of candidate do not depend so much on an individ-
ual’s adherence to the values and objectives of a political organisation as
on the image projected by a candidate, and on his or her ability to convince
them that he or she is different – and will be able not only to lead his or
her party in a new direction, but also to give a new impetus to Taiwan in
economic matters and on the international scene.
In 2008, Ma Ying-jeou’s campaign team was able to take advantage of his
“star status” and of the goodwill he had accumulated during his two terms
as Mayor of Taipei. Led by King Pu-tsung (金溥聰), it sought to break away
from the two previous campaigns, during which Lien Chan and the 
Kuomintang had never managed to shake off the image of “an oldster’s
party” on the defensive. In 2008, the KMT did not just settle for campaigning
on the same issues as the DPP. It also copied its visual and acoustic aesthetic
codes (the emphasis on the diversity of the landscapes and cultures of Tai-
wan, the recurrent use of the island’s shape to symbolise the Taiwanese po-
litical community, the cover versions of songs previously used by the DPP)
to such an extent that it was sometimes difficult to know which of the two
parties had produced certain advertisements before the last few frames. (19)
In parallel, the rejuvenation of the Kuomintang’s image was effected by
highlighting the dynamism of Ma Ying-jeou. Photogenic and a sportsman
of irreproachable integrity, he embodied the new KMT and the possibility,
or at least the hope, of a new inspiration for Taiwan, while the DPP had been
increasingly embroiled in corruption scandals for several years.
But after four years as head of state, Ma Ying-jeou could no longer count
on the novelty of his candidacy to persuade young voters. Physically worn
out, frequently criticised for his incompetence, his U-turns and his hypocrisy,
he also had to defend a highly controversial economic record very far from
the slogan “6-3-3” that summarised the promise made in 2008 of 6 percent
annual growth, GDP of US$30,000 per capita, and a reduction in unemploy-
ment to below 3 percent. The Kuomintang could be said to be back to
square one. Its efforts to win back young voters were very much in evidence
throughout the campaign. They are mirrored in the very choice of logo and
of the slogan in “Taiwanese Mandarin” (Taiwan guoyu 台灣國語). Both bor-
row from the “youth culture”: a thumb in the form of Taiwan pointing up-
ward that recalls the one used on Facebook, accompanied by “Go Taiwan” 
(台灣加油) or “Go Super Taiwan” (Taiwan jiayouzan 台灣加油讚), the latter
being also used on Facebook to show that someone appreciates a post. Ma
Ying-jeou’s team, led once again by King Pu-tsung, also appointed two
spokespeople under 30: Yin Wei (殷瑋) and Ma Wei-kuo (馬瑋國). The choice
of the former was judicious: before joining the KMT, he had attracted notice
in 2010 for his opposition to the signing of the Economic Cooperation
Framework Agreement (ECFA) with China. The support of both spokespeople
for Ma was highlighted in several video sequences that were part of a range
of campaign clips clearly aimed at reaching young voters, for example the
rock clip with the English title “We Are One,” the short film in two ten-
minute parts called “The Girl with the Flag” (guoqi nühai國旗女孩), which
we will return to later, and an edited version of Ma Ying-jeou’s meetings
and discussions with students in several universities. The Kuomintang also
fielded ten candidates aged under 40 in the legislative elections.
Ma’s opponent, Tsai Ing-wen, had several assets with which to embody a
new fervour. Aged 55, she had the profile of an academic trained abroad,
which was relatively similar to that of her rival, but with more freshness.
After studying Law at Cornell and the London School of Economics, she had
taught for several years. During Chen Shui-bian’s terms she had been Min-
ister for Mainland Affairs from 2000 to 2004, and Deputy Prime Minister in
2006-2007. After the failure of the DPP ticket of Hsieh Chang-ting and Su
Tseng-chang, which had received only 41.55 percent of the vote, she had
taken over the leadership of a deeply troubled DPP in May 2008.
Her association with the Chen government could have damaged her
chances with the centrist electorate. Indeed, the KMT sought several times
to present her as close to the former president, and therefore as an extremist
separatist. Wrong-footing these accusations by presenting her candidacy as
the result of four years of reorganisation and of repositioning in the centre
of the political field after the stinging defeats suffered by the DPP between
2005 and 2008, Tsai clearly sought to make people forget the DPP’s dark
years by embodying its new face, moderate and modern, and its ability to
govern the country once again. Tsai’s campaign team opted for a complete
break from the visual codes, themes, and tone that had been used up to
then. In visual terms, the colour green normally used by the DPP in reference
to the party’s flag was replaced by yellow, dark pink, and orange. The slogan
in English “Taiwan Next” on a yellow arrow tilted upwards and associated
with the phrase “Let’s Decide Our Future Now” (xianzai jueding weilai現在
決定未來) summarised in itself the general positioning of the campaign de-
cided by Tsai: focused on the island’s future rather than based on the legit-
imacy the DPP could draw from its past struggles for democracy; and
centred on Taiwan and the real day-to-day problems experienced by the
population rather than on separatist rhetoric, on an impossible accession
to the UN, or on denunciation of the Chinese threat. The tone was con-
trolled, with Tsai Ing-wen making use of her academic status to try to appear
close to the people without being populist.
The style adopted by Tsai Ing-wen no doubt cost her votes among the
older voters of the south of Taiwan, who could not identify with a campaign
so different from those of her predecessors. The interviews carried out indi-
cate that, on the other hand, it certainly contributed to reassuring and
arousing the interest of young voters.
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Tsai Ing-wen speaking at a gathering near her campaign
headquarters. Copyright: Hubert Kilian
The concerns of young voters about the
future
The support Tsai enjoyed from at the beginning of the campaign among
20-to-29-year-olds can also be explained by the fact that the criticisms
aimed at Ma’s government were similar to the anxieties of that fringe of
the electorate about its future. The DPP spotlighted the internal problems
of Taiwan and the necessity of solving them by putting in place a policy of
sustainable development in the wider sense, which is to say economic
growth that is not produced to the detriment of an already seriously dam-
aged natural environment, but which would also be used to improve social
and generational justice.
Tsai Ing-wen and her team tried to show that the Ma government’s eco-
nomic development decisions entailed the sacrifice of the present and fu-
ture living conditions of a large part of the Taiwanese population. In
environmental matters, their attacks were concentrated on nuclear power
and Ma Ying-jeou’s determination to carry on with the construction of a
fourth power plant despite the lessons of the Fukushima disaster. But it was
especially the economic criticisms that made it possible for Tsai to score
points with young voters. At the core of these criticisms was the deteriora-
tion of their living and working conditions. A series of five very short films
on the theme “President Ma, you have broken a record” (Ma zongtong nin
po jilu le馬總統您破記錄了) referred, for example, to the difficulties facing
those who are entering the job market or want to have a family: the high
rate of unemployment among young graduates (12.97 percent of 20-to-
24-year-olds in 2011); the impossibility of becoming a property owner in
Taipei; the fact that, in contrast with the cost of living, salaries were not ris-
ing and that in 2010, 3.6 million employees earned less than 30,000 Tai-
wanese dollars (NT$) per month (about 750 euros); the increasing
inequalities of income; and Taiwan’s rapidly increasing debt, which will weigh
on future generations.
While the figures put forward by the DPP were sometimes called into
question, an overwhelming majority of those interviewed in the course of
2011 agreed with these criticisms. It must be said that the growth in GDP
(10 percent in 2010 and around 4 percent in 2011) and “competitivity
gains” on which the government put much emphasis conceal the deterio-
ration in the real working conditions of the majority of Taiwanese, and the
young in particular, whose salaries continue to shrink while their working
days grow longer. According to a survey carried out by the employment
agency 104 Job Bank in the spring of 2011, the 639 companies surveyed
were prepared to pay an average monthly salary of 26,432 NT$ to an em-
ployee who had just obtained a degree. (20) Five years earlier, according to
government figures, the average salary offered for a first job was 26,700
NT$, which already amounted to a drop of 762 NT$ in comparison with
1998. (21)
Over three-quarters (77 percent) of students who responded to a survey
of first-time voters carried out in 20 universities at the end of 2011 by Ob-
servation Group on National Politics were disappointed by the government’s
lack of effort to resolve the problem of unemployment and of the low
salaries paid to the young. (22) Most of the students I interviewed in the
course of 2011, including a large part of the 27 who had already entered
the job market, believed that Ma Ying-jeou had not managed to improve
their situation. On the contrary, as they saw it, several of his initiatives had
had a pernicious effect, for example the policy of subsidies offered by the
government, beginning in 2009, to companies that recruited a young grad-
uate for a salary set at 22,000 NT$ on a one-year contract. This policy was
originally intended to reduce unemployment at a time when the recession
was hitting the Taiwanese economy hard. In many cases it backfired, how-
ever, since it provided employers with an excuse to reduce salaries to the
level of what they presented as being the standard set by the government.
Low salaries are combined with ever longer working days. (23) In 2012 the
Taiwanese worked an average of 181.2 hours per month, or 2,174 hours per
year. (24) If Taiwan were a member of the OECD, the island would be the sec-
ond country where people spent the highest number of hours at work, just
behind South Korea (2,193 hours per person in 2010). (25) But these are only
the hours declared by employers. A survey carried out in the spring of 2011
shows that four-fifths of Taiwanese office workers worked between 10 and
11 hours per day. (26) In 70 percent of cases, they were not paid for the extra
hours worked.
Far from the campaign promises made in 2008, the continuing deteriora-
tion of working conditions under Ma Ying-jeou’s presidency shows the lim-
itations of the unprecedented acceleration of the liberalisation of trade with
China, despite its having been presented by the KMT government as the so-
lutions to all Taiwan’s ills. At the time of the signing of the Economic Coop-
eration Framework Agreement (ECFA) at the end of June 2010, the Ma
administration was accordingly insisting that it would protect Taiwan from
economic marginalisation when the PRC was pushing for the establishment
of vast free trade areas in the region. However, as has been pointed out by
Philippe Chevalérias, while Taiwan is not in reality as economically isolated
as the Ma government would have people believe, its economy faces struc-
tural problems that the ECFA and the liberalisation of trade with China can-
not resolve. (27)
The abolition of most of the restrictions on investment and technology
transfer to China do indeed encourage Taiwanese companies not to revise
a growth model dating back to the early 1990s and based on a headlong
rush to exploit low labour costs in China. (28) The logic of short-term prof-
itability drains away a major part of investment and brainpower towards
the quest for economies of scale by the transfer of production to China, to
the detriment of strategies of increasing margin by the creation of innova-
tive or high-end products and the development of internationally-recog-
nised brands. Thus, with a few exceptions (HTC, Acer, Asus), Taiwanese
companies remain trapped in a globalised chain of command in which they
occupy the highly uncomfortable position of subcontractor. In order to re-
main competitive, they seek to keep labour costs as low as possible by re-
ducing wages and resorting to unpaid overtime work. The first to suffer from
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this development “model” are the least qualified employees and thus often
the youngest.
However, the interviews show a more finely-shaded vision of economic
integration between the two sides of the Taiwan strait. The people inter-
viewed often recognise the negative impact of delocalisation on the wage
levels in Taiwan because of the transfer of a major part of managerial jobs
to the other side of the Strait and the heavy pressure from competition
with the Chinese labour market. But they also believe that development of
relations with China is vital for the Taiwanese economy. This is why the
warming of relations between Taipei and Beijing and the signing of 15 tech-
nical agreements are generally well perceived. The majority of students are
in favour of the establishment of direct air, sea, and postal connections as
well as the opening to Chinese tourism. Where the ECFA is concerned, while
they find it more difficult to come out clearly for or against, the agreement
is only rarely rejected in its entirety and is more often perceived from the
point of view put forward by the Kuomintang Government: it will endanger
certain traditional sectors that are in any case bound to disappear in the
short or medium term, but will ultimately make it possible to avoid mar-
ginalisation and make the economy more competitive.
During the survey I carried out in 2010, three-fifths (61.7 percent) of the
students thought that, from a general point of view, China was a source of
economic opportunity for Taiwan, while less than a quarter (23.8 percent)
perceived a danger. This impression has become stronger since. The cam-
paign conducted by the KMT and the media favourable to the government,
based on Taiwan’s good performance in the face of the world economic
slowdown, has reinforced the idea that economic integration between the
two shores is not without its negative aspects, but that the situation would
be even worse if Taiwan could not hitch itself to China’s growth. Faced with
this situation, most of the young people interviewed adopt a fatalistic at-
titude, feeling that they can do nothing in the face of “market forces,” or
believing that it is down to individuals to equip themselves as well as pos-
sible in order to rise in the ranks and be able to get their head above water.
All in all, Tsai Ing-wen could emphasise the sufferings endured by the gen-
eration beginning adult life and entering the job market, and she could crit-
icise the Ma government’s inability to stop the deterioration of the job
market and the impoverishment of the population, but it was difficult for
her to attack the heart of the problem – the Taiwanese economy’s excessive
dependence on China – without putting her credibility at risk, so strong is
the perception that the continued development of relations between the
two shores is essential for Taiwan’s economic survival. In the sphere of re-
lations between Taiwan and China, Tsai Ing-wen could not therefore put for-
ward a radically different project. She was forced to campaign on the KMT’s
preferred ground: the continuation of good relations with Beijing.
Identification with Taiwan and the island’s
international status
While left in the background, behind economic issues, identification with
Taiwan and the island’s status on the international scene were two other
major themes. They are also two subjects that, despite misleading appear-
ances, preoccupy young Taiwanese. However, as was the case in 2008, the
DPP was not able to benefit from them, firstly because young voters are
wary of the instrumentalisation of issues of identity, secondly because they
do not draw a clear distinction between the values and objectives put for-
ward by the DPP and the KMT, and finally because the KMT was careful to
emphasise its local roots as well as the effective defence of Taiwan’s inter-
national existence and the dignity of the Taiwanese through its policy of
reconciliation with Beijing.
Young Taiwanese often say that they are tired of the constant emphasis
on issues of identity. (29) While they are reluctant to go into them, this is not
because they do not consider them important, but because they feel that
identification with Taiwan is a given, that it is shared by the overwhelming
majority of the population and that they therefore refuse to join in with
the game of manipulation and division of identity played by both sides. Thus
almost two-thirds (63.7 percent) of those interviewed during the survey I
carried out in the spring of 2010 either “strongly disapproved” (30.1 percent)
or “disapproved” (33.6 percent) when asked if they “agreed with the idea
put forward by some that ‘loving Taiwan is supporting a native Taiwanese
government’.” They see accusations based on ethnicity as inappropriate. A
person’s place of birth or that of his/her ancestors should not presume loy-
alty to Taiwan. They consider ethnicity above all as a component in the con-
struct of individual identity and do not perceive it according to a logic of
opposition between a supposedly historically legitimate group of “Native
Taiwanese” (benshengren 本省人) and a group of “Mainlanders” (waishen-
gren 外省人), most of whom were born in Taiwan, but who are supposed to
constantly seek redemption for the “original sin” of the circumstances of
their parents’ or grandparents’ migration to the island. (30)
Likewise, students of the post-reform generation show a certain wariness
towards the question of national identity, not because they don’t care or
because they reject the division of the world into nation states, but rather
because they do not identify with the reductive formulation of the debate
on the political scene and in the media sphere. To them, the binary and ex-
clusive opposition between Taiwanese identity and Chinese identity does
not make sense, because their identification with a Taiwanese nation-state
is usually combined with the maintenance of Taiwan in the Chinese ethno-
cultural sphere. The data from the 2010 survey show that identification with
Taiwan is very widely shared in this generation and that it does correspond
to a national identity. (31) Three quarters (74.8 percent) of the students who
answered the questionnaire described themselves as either “Taiwanese”
(40.9 percent) or both “Taiwanese and Chinese (Huaren)” (33.9 percent).
Moreover, almost all of them (85.3 percent) declared themselves in favour
of the independence of Taiwan if this could be achieved while maintaining
good relations with the People’s Republic. Only 4 percent were against, while
10.7 percent did not know. (32) Other replies, for which space is not sufficient
to go into detail here, reinforce the conclusion that most of the time, being
“Taiwanese” to these young people does indeed mean having a feeling of
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belonging to a territorialised political community restricted to Taiwan, the
Penghus, and a few dozen smaller islands: they expect the government to
put the interests of Taiwan and of its population ahead of any other con-
sideration; they claim the right to self-determination and believe that the
improvement of Taiwan’s international status must be among the govern-
ment’s priorities.
However, freed from the frictions of a nationalism that would have the
sense of belonging to Taiwan exclude any form of identification with China,
the national identity of this generation is characterised by a more positive
attitude to the heterogeneity that constitutes the foundation of Taiwanese
culture, and by a pride in being Taiwanese that does not mechanically imply
rejection of the Chinese ethno-cultural basis of that identity. The question-
naire distributed in 2010 shows that only a fifth (20.5 percent) of the stu-
dents opposed the idea put forward several times by Ma Ying-jeou that “the
peoples on both sides of the strait are the descendants of the Emperors Yan
and Huang,” while over half (51.9 percent) said they either “agreed” or
“agreed completely,” and a quarter (26.4 percent) had no opinion on the
question. (33) But these blood ties and the recognition that Taiwan belongs
to the Chinese cultural sphere do not translate into political terms. This is
why most of the young who wish to combine a Chinese dimension with
their Taiwanese national identity prefer to use the category “Huaren” 華人
(rather than “Zhongguoren” 中國人), the former having an ethno-cultural
dimension while the latter has a more political meaning.
From this point of view, there is no contradiction between the affirmation
of a Taiwanese national identity and the emphasis on a Chinese ethnicity.
Nor is there any contradiction between the feeling of belonging to a Tai-
wanese political community that wishes to be independent and the desire
to preserve the Chinese cultural heritage, and even the existence of the Re-
public of China on Taiwan as a melding together of two historical paths:
that of a past specific to the island, and that of a state “born in China, but
having grown and reached its democratic maturity in Taiwan.” Thus in the
eyes of the majority of the members of this generation, although Ma Ying-
jeou and many leading cadres are “Mainlanders” who stand up for the her-
itage of the Republic of China, their party is no less Taiwanese than the DPP.
A tiny minority of the students questioned on this subject believed that the
KMT was not a local party. (34) The political dimension of the economic in-
tegration between the two shores does not seem so simple to them, and
they do not see the KMT as a Chinese nationalist party seeking to “sell Tai-
wan” to China. On the contrary, many support it because they consider it
the most likely to raise the status of Taiwan on the international scene. This
was the first reason given by those students who stated their preference for
the KMT in answer to the questionnaire distributed in 2010, ahead of “the
promotion of economic development” and the opening of talks about
peace.
Ma Ying-jeou and the Kuomintang made numerous efforts to confirm the
impressions of young Taiwanese. They constantly underlined their identifi-
cation with Taiwan, associated the defence of the Republic of China (ROC)
with that of the interests and sovereignty of the island, and put forward
what they considered to be the improvement of Taiwan’s international 
situation thanks to the reopening of dialogue with Beijing. The KMT cam-
paign team produced a number of films aimed at proving Ma’s attachment
to and identification with Taiwan, for example two interviews with his Hoklo
and Hakka language teachers. All these films particularly emphasised the
plurality of origins of the Taiwanese population and the cultural richness en-
joyed by Taiwan because of this diversity. For example, this was the theme
at the centre of the flagship song of the KMT campaign, the chorus of which,
in Mandarin and English, was “Under the same sky, we are one” (同一片天
空, we are one). It opens with a poster for the film Seediq Bale and shows
two young musicians setting off around Taiwan on a motorcycle to find the
“different voices” of the island’s inhabitants, who give them balloons of all
colours, symbolising their ethnic and cultural diversity. In each place they
stop, the clip names and emphasises the beauty of 20 regions, towns, and
villages in Taiwan, emphasises its island character, works through certain as-
pects that are generally considered to be at the centre of “Taiwanese cultural
identity” (baseball, a night market, a temple and religious practices), and
emphasises the diversity in the origins of the Taiwanese population by pre-
senting two extremes: a group of older women in Paiwan (排灣族) dress
and a group of “new residents” (xinzhumin 新住民), an administrative cat-
egory created to designate foreigners who are married to Taiwanese and
have obtained naturalisation.
The importance given to foreigners who have come to settle in Taiwan, to
their “love of the island,” and their naturalisation seems to me particularly
interesting because it reveals a new attempt to legitimise the place of Main-
landers within the Taiwanese population: in the end, they are only one
among many waves of immigration to Taiwan, part of a chain that began
long before their time and that is going to continue with the arrival of non-
Han people and the consequent mixing of the population. In the clip “We
are one,” a row of “new residents” holds up balloons on which is written
“We Love Taiwan” in Mandarin. Two of them then proudly display their Tai-
wanese identity cards. This sequence recalls two other KMT campaign clips.
These are accounts in Mandarin given by foreigners who are naturalised Tai-
wanese. One is an American who has lived in Taiwan for 20 years, and did
two years’ military service there. The other is a woman of Franco-Dominican
origin, married to a Hakka. Both praise Taiwan and make it clear that they
do not wish to live anywhere else. The films end with the words “I am Tai-
wanese, I am a citizen of the Republic of China.”
Here there appears a tactical move already used by the KMT in 2008, as
well as every time it has been criticised for the nature of its links with the
Chinese Communist Party and for its ultimate objective: concealing its re-
turn to a pan-Chinese nationalist ideology behind the promotion of a rela-
tionship of equivalency between the Republic of China and Taiwan. To do
so, the KMT has played cleverly on the ambiguity of bringing together two
symbolic markers: the flag of the ROC and the shape of the island of Taiwan.
Ma Ying-jeou’s whole campaign was in the colours of the flag, which was
omnipresent in the electoral evenings, in the advertisements, and on all the
ancillary merchandise. But while the overabundant use of the flag allowed
the KMT to materialise the link between Taiwan and China through the his-
tory of the Republic and thus to mobilise the “Dark Blue” electorate, its very
frequent association with the shape of the island was also supposed to recall
its commitment to maintaining the sovereignty of Taiwan, the flag then
being the symbol of the existence of Taiwan. The KMT campaign overflowed
with different combinations of the flag with the shape of Taiwan. For ex-
ample, when the two young musicians mentioned set off on their tour of
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Taiwan, a close-up shows the flag of the ROC cut into the shape of the is-
land on the white background of their motorcycle helmets.
It must also be underlined that in the campaign films aimed at young vot-
ers, the state was very rarely called the “Republic of China” and much more
often “Taiwan.” In the short film “The Girl with the Flag” referred to above,
the country at the centre of the story is Taiwan; the Republic of China is not
mentioned once. And when, at the end of the film, the young heroine is at
last able to say what is meant by the flag of the ROC that she has been
given and with which she has travelled all over Taiwan, she refers only to
the values of freedom, equality, and fraternity; not a word about its historical
origins. Even though this vision is far from being its own, the KMT didn’t get
it wrong. This is how the young Taiwanese perceive and appropriate the flag:
as the symbol of the existence of a Taiwanese state and the democratic val-
ues that it carries, but devoid of any reference to Greater China or to Chinese
nationalism. The disappearance of the Republic of China behind Taiwan is
also striking in the KMT slogan: “Go Taiwan.”
Finally, in order to materialise the Ma administration’s efforts in the de-
fence of the sovereignty of Taiwan and of its existence on the international
scene, its team based itself on what it presented as an unprecedented im-
provement in the status of Taiwan. In reality, the Kuomintang had only a
very few victories to its credit. The “diplomatic truce” with China has allowed
Taiwan to keep its 23 allies, but it has not led to a reduction in the pressure
brought to bear by Beijing on the international community as a whole to
eradicate the presence of the ROC. The KMT therefore seized on anything
that might appear to be a success, such as the signing of agreements that
allow Taiwanese nationals to travel without visas to 124 countries, in order
to give substance to a vast communication campaign aimed at showing,
on the one hand, that the international community approved the policy of
détente in China-Taiwan relations, and on the other that the Taiwanese ben-
efited from it directly. On this topic it is certain that the decision of the
United States, announced on 22 December, to add Taiwan to the list of
countries being considered for visa exemption for entry to American soil
favoured the incumbent president. It materialised the Obama administra-
tion’s support for Ma’s re-election.
The decisive influence of relations with
China
Apart from the few weeks of intense debate that followed Ma Ying-jeou’s
proposal to sign a peace agreement with China in the ten years that would
follow his re-election, the question of Taiwan’s political future, which is to
say the choice between independence and reunification, remained in the
background of the campaign. Both parties knew well that in order to win
the elections they would have to set aside their long-term political objec-
tives – the unification of Greater China for the KMT, and the formal recog-
nition of the independence of Taiwan for the DPP. Ma Ying-jeou therefore
restricted himself to the slogan of the “Three NOs” (no to unification, no
to independence and no to the use of force), and Tsai Ing-wen stuck to the
Resolution on the future of Taiwan passed by the DPP in 1999, which states
that it is not necessary to declare independence, since the island is already
a sovereign state constitutionally named the Republic of China.
However, Ma Ying-jeou’s 17 October 2011 proposal to open peace talks
with China forced the DPP to react and to concentrate its attacks on the
potentially fatal dangers to the sovereignty of the state of Taiwan of such
an initiative. (35) This lasted several weeks. Public reaction to this proposal
was highly unfavourable, and it made Ma’s popularity dip in the polls. But
it also allowed the KMT to refocus the campaign on the importance of good
relations with China and on the prerequisites for the continuation of dia-
logue with Beijing. In other words, this risky move resulted in a shift in the
centre of gravity of the campaign. From a critique of Ma Ying-jeou’s track
record, it moved towards the absolute necessity of pursuing the institution-
alisation of relations with China in order to avoid any risk of uncontrolled
escalation. This shift was of course highly advantageous to Ma. The DPP ini-
tially scored some successes by underlining the fact that the Chinese ne-
gotiators would certainly demand that the unification of the two sides of
the strait be written into the text of the agreement, which would eliminate
any margin for manoeuvre in the definition of the political future of Taiwan.
But the KMT then quickly succeeded in burying the controversial project by
repeating that until favourable conditions emerged for the resolving the dif-
ferences between the two shores, it was essential to maintain a framework
within which discussions could continue while preserving the peace and the
“status quo.” This was the framework that the Ma administration had man-
aged to establish on the basis of the “1992 Consensus” (jiuer gongshi 九二
共識), according to which Taipei and Beijing are alleged to have arrived at
an oral agreement recognising the existence of a single China, with each
side having its own interpretation of the meaning of this “One China.”
During the last few weeks of campaigning, the KMT was able to rely on
considerably more generous funding than was available to the DPP, as well
as the support of much of the TV and print media in order to foreground
the “1992 consensus.” It also enjoyed massive support from the business
world, which came out in favour of the “consensus,” or more indirectly, of
“stable relations between the two shores.” (36) On the eve of polling day, for
example, a group of 127 entrepreneurs placed an advertisement in Apple
Daily stating, “In the present economic conditions, whoever supports the
1992 Consensus maintains stable relations between the two sides of the
strait, which allows us in turn to govern without fear and to continue to
take care of our employees and their families. (37)
Tsai Ing-wen could not find any way to get out of the path of such a steam-
roller. While she was in a strong position at the beginning of the campaign,
when most of the debate was about the deterioration of the living and work-
ing conditions of the Taiwanese population, she got into difficulties once the
spotlight shifted to how each side aimed to pursue the dialogue with Beijing
and thus guarantee the preservation of the peace and its “dividends,” as the
KMT put it. The DPP could not recognise the “1992 Consensus” – which is to
say a single China of which Taiwan would be a part – without betraying itself.
But at the same time, it had to show that a different path was possible. Tsai
Ing-wen strove to provide reassurance by stating that she would not renege
on either the 15 technical agreements signed by the KMT government or
even the ECFA, although the latter would be subject to careful re-examina-
tion. However she was not able to convince voters that her election and the
return of the DPP would not mean a breaking-off of dialogue with Beijing
and that it would not compromise the development of trade with China. Nor
did she succeed in explaining how she would overcome Beijing’s intransi-
gence on the recognition of the principle of a single China as a precondition
to any discussion, or in detailing the road map that was to accompany the
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paradigm shift she was proposing, which is to say, “going towards China with
the world, not going towards the world with China.”
The series of polls taken about every two weeks by the TVBS station’s sur-
vey centre shows that among voters between 20 and 29 who intended to
vote, Ma Ying-jeou “bottomed out” in mid-November. A poll taken between
8 and 10 November showed that Tsai Ing-wen had 54 percent of the in-
tended vote as against only 28 percent for Ma Ying-jeou and 8 percent for
the third candidate, Soong Chu-yu.
Ma then began a gradual climb, overtaking Tsai Ing-wen at the beginning
of January and maintaining a slight lead over his rival up to the election. A
poll completed on 6 January gave Ma a two-point lead, with 41 percent, as
against 39 percent for Tsai and 9 percent for Soong. Another, taken two days
after polling day, showed that Ma Ying-jeou had maintained this lead and
had also very probably benefited from the transfer of votes that had previ-
ously gone to Soong Chu-yu. Forty-five percent of the young respondents
said they had voted for Ma Ying-jeou, 37 percent for Tsai Ing-wen, and 3
percent for Soong Chu-yu, with the remaining 5 percent not answering.
The interviews and discussions during the focus groups showed that it
was her inability to get beyond the stage of criticism and to convince voters
that she had a viable alternative that made Tsai Ing-wen finally lose a major
part of the young floating vote. Her attacks on Ma Ying-jeou’s record were
indeed well founded and effective at the beginning of the campaign, but
they were then replaced by a series of doubts: would the DPP candidate be
able to put together a competent team; how much margin for manoeuvre
did she have vis-à-vis Beijing; would she really be able to provide solutions
to the economic and social problems she denounced? Her announcement
on 6 January 2012, eight days before the poll, of the possibility of forming
a coalition government if she was elected was far from reassuring.
Conclusion
In addition to the structural advantages that Ma Ying-jeou enjoyed (KMT
funds, highly favourable media, solid constituency votes), Frank Muyard and
Stéphane Corcuff agree that his re-election was the result of a choice by de-
fault. (38) As they see it, there were many who finally voted for Ma despite
the feeling of disappointment, or even strong antipathy, he aroused in them.
These impressions are confirmed among the 20-to-29-year-olds. At the be-
ginning of the campaign, support for Tsai Ing-wen was based on the disap-
pointment caused by the unkept promises of Ma Ying-jeou, on the anxiety
of the young about their future, on agreement with the criticisms made by
the DPP candidate, and on hopes of a break and an alternative project for
Taiwan. This support was not a given, however; despite what is often said,
identification with the DPP is no stronger among the young than among the
rest of the population. While it often has high ratings among that section of
the population, these are usually temporary, thanks to some of its candidates
and to the style of its campaigns. The KMT learnt a lot in this area from its
defeats. It also managed to neutralise the question of identification with Tai-
wan. Consequently, many of the young voters who supported Tsai Ing-wen
were likely to slip away from her at any time. This is what happened in the
end, because Tsai did not manage to convince voters of the viability of her
project vis-à-vis further development of economic relations with China. On
the other hand, the support given to Ma by the Taiwanese business world,
the United States, and of course China, certainly contributed to associating
his re-election with the maintenance of a certain stability.
The changes in voting intentions of this generation therefore show both
a certain pragmatism and an increasing tension between the attraction of
Chinese economic power and the dynamic of the reinforcement of Tai-
wanese national identity. It also reflects its determination to maintain good
relations with the unavoidable Chinese neighbour at a time when its his-
torical protector, the US, seems to be in decline. However, while the young
finally went over to Ma Ying-jeou and his “1992 consensus,” it is above all
because, for lack of anything better, they hope that Ma will be able to pre-
serve the status quo, Taiwanese democracy, and peace in the Strait. It is
therefore certainly not a vote in favour of closer political ties between the
two sides of the strait, and even less of unification.
z Translated by Michael Black
z Tanguy Le Pesant is an Assistant Professor at National Central Uni-
versity (Chongli, Taiwan), and is an associate researcher at the CEFC
in Taipei.
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